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THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S FIGHT
TO STAY RATIONAL:
SHELBY COUNTY V. HOLDER
*

SUDEEP PAUL

I. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1950s and 1960s, Congress attempted to battle voter
discrimination through case-by-case litigation with the help of civil
1
rights legislation from 1957, 1960, and 1964. For example, “Title I of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expedited the hearing of voting cases
before three-judge courts and outlawed some of the tactics used to
2
disqualify [black citizens] from voting in federal elections.” These
attempts failed to create long-term change; barring certain types of
discriminatory voting practices simply led to a modification of
3
methods —Southern voting officials would do everything from ignore
4
court orders to freeze voting rolls by closing registration offices. To
combat these invidious tactics and “to banish the blight of racial
5
discrimination in voting,” Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of
6
1965.

*

J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law.
1. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313 (1966).
2. Id. at 314. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 granted the Attorney General authority to
seek injunctions against any interference with the right to vote based on race. The Civil Rights
Act of 1960 allowed the Attorney General to access “local voting records, and authorized courts
to register voters in areas with systemic discrimination.” Id.
3. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 2441 (1965). See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314 (noting that
following the enactment of civil rights legislation, voting officials switched to “discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees”).
4. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered
Forrest County, Mississippi to give black voting applicants the same assistance its registrars had
given to white applicants, and to register black applicants who had errors on their applications
that were not serious enough to disqualify white applicants. The Mississippi Legislature
responded by “requiring applicants to complete their registration forms without assistance or
error.” United States v. Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 996–97 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
5. Id. at 308.
6. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
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The Fifteenth Amendment states that the right to vote cannot be
denied on the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of
7
servitude.” The Voting Rights Act was created to uphold the
Fifteenth Amendment, by strengthening existing remedies to combat
voter discrimination and by creating “stringent new remedies for
8
voting discrimination.” Section 2 of the Act is a nationwide provision
9
that prohibits voter discrimination and allows individuals to bring
suit against any jurisdiction, including any State, “to challenge voting
10
practices that have a discriminatory purpose or result.” Section 5 of
the Act permits the Attorney General to review and approve any
voting legislation proposed by specific jurisdictions; certain
jurisdictions are identified by Section 4(b)’s coverage formula as
11
being particularly likely to discriminate.
12
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court will be called on
to decide whether Congress’s 2006 reauthorization of Section 5 and
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula in the Voting Rights Act is a
permissible use of Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
powers. Additionally, the Court may decide the appropriate standard
of review under which to consider the constitutionality of legislation
passed under Congress’s Section 2 power of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Shelby County contends that Section 5 of the Act
13
oversteps the boundaries of federalism and is no longer needed. In
light of the long-standing history and importance of the Act, the
Court’s precedents, and the continued existence of voting
discrimination in this country, the Court is unlikely to find Section 5
14
of the Act unconstitutional. The Court may, however, find Section
4(b)’s coverage formula unconstitutional on the grounds that the
formula’s data is outdated and it does not properly represent today’s
political conditions.

7. U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1.
8. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013).
10. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96).
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c.
12. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2013).
13. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Dec. 26, 2012)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
14. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323 (1966) (“Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”).

FORMATTED POST FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S FIGHT TO STAY RATIONAL

6/3/2013 10:10 PM

273

II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a far-reaching
statute to combat voter discrimination both at a national level and at
a jurisdiction-specific level. Congress passed the Act under Section 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the authority to
15
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation.”
In addition, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
16
has authority to pass “appropriate legislation” to uphold the Equal
17
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Voting Rights Act contains permanent provisions and
temporary provisions. The central permanent provision of the Act,
Section 2, forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
18
States to vote on account of race or color.” The temporary
provisions, which include the “preclearance requirement of Section 5”
and the coverage formula in Section 4(b), may be renewed
19
periodically by Congress. The two provisions of the Act being
challenged by Shelby County are Section 4(b) and Section 5.
Congress uses the coverage formula of Section 4(b) to determine
which jurisdictions are abridging the voting rights of their citizens
within the meaning of the Act and are thus subject to Section 5’s
20
preclearance requirements.
The coverage formula covers
jurisdictions that (1) used any voting test or device during 1964, 1968,
or 1972, and (2) had less than 50% of its citizens either registered to
21
vote or vote in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential elections. The Act
15. See U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”).
16. Id. at amend XIV, § 5 (giving Congress authority to enact appropriate legislation to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. See id., § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”).
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West 2013). The abridgement of voting rights includes the use of
intimidation and providing false information in registering or voting. Id. § 1973i(b)–(c).
19. See U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division Voting Section–Frequently Asked
UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
Questions,
THE
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/faq.php (last visited May 7, 2013) (“In 2006, Congress
passed the Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights and
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006 which renews nearly all of the temporary
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.”).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b). States can be covered jurisdictions within the meaning of the
Act. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (describing the State of Alabama as a jurisdiction originally
covered in its entirety).
21. Id.
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defines a voting test or device to be:
any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or
registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write,
understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any
educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular
subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his
qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of
22
any other class.

A jurisdiction identified by Section 4(b) must, under Section 5,
submit for approval all proposed voting changes to either the
Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District
23
of Columbia. The Attorney General and the D.C. District Court will
grant preclearance if the proposed voting change “neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
24
vote on account of race or color.” A voting change is considered to
abridge the right to vote if it will have the effect of diminishing a
citizen’s ability to elect his or her candidate of choice on account of
25
race, color or speaking language. If the Attorney General or the D.C.
District Court does not pre-clear the proposed change then the
26
jurisdiction is prohibited from enacting the law or procedure.
A jurisdiction not identified by Section 4(b) can subsequently be
brought under Section 5’s requirements by being “bailed-in”; a court
may “bail-in” a jurisdiction if it is found to be denying the voting
27
guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. As a
countermeasure, the Act also allows jurisdictions to apply to be
“bailed-out” of Section 5’s preclearance requirements and regain
28
complete autonomy in passing voting legislation.
22. Id. § 1973b(c).
23. Id. § 1973c.
24. Id. § 1973c(a).
25. Id. § 1973c(b).
26. Id. § 1973c(a).
27. Id. § 1973a(c).
28. Id. § 1973b(a)(1). To qualify for bailout, the covered jurisdiction must show that the
jurisdiction, as well as any of its sub-jurisdictions, has not in the preceding ten years: (1) used a
test or device to determine voter eligibility; (2) received a judgment by any court holding that
the jurisdiction has denied or abridged the right to vote on account of race or color; (3) had
federal observers assigned to the jurisdiction; (4) been found to have passed a voting change
without preclearance approval; or (5) had the Attorney General object to a proposed voting
change under Section 5. Additionally, the jurisdiction has to ensure that it has eliminated voting
procedures that “inhibit or dilute equal access to the electoral process,” and that it has “engaged
in constructive efforts to eliminate intimidation and harassment” of voters. The jurisdiction
must also have “engaged in other constructive efforts, such as expanded opportunity for
convenient registration and voting for every person of voting age and the appointment of
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Petitioner Shelby County, Alabama (Shelby County or the
County) is a political subdivision of Alabama that has been subject to
29
preclearance requirements since 1965. The County became a
covered subdivision when Respondent United States Attorney
General determined that Alabama should be a covered state pursuant
to Section 4(b) because it had used a prohibited test or device and
had a voter turnout of less than 50% for the 1964 presidential
30
election. Since 1965, Shelby County and the jurisdictions within
Shelby County have submitted at least 682 voting changes to the
Attorney General for preclearance; the Attorney General objected to
five of the proposed changes, including a proposed redistricting plan
31
by a city located in Shelby County, which was submitted in 2008. The
County has never applied for bailout, though it is likely ineligible as it
has violated the Act by holding several special elections without
seeking preclearance, and the Attorney General has objected to at
32
least one proposed voting change within the last ten years.
Shelby County sought a declaratory judgment that Sections 4(b)
and 5 of the Voting Rights Act are facially unconstitutional, and
sought a permanent injunction barring the Attorney General from
33
enforcing these sections. The District Court assessed Shelby
County’s claims by examining two categories of evidence: first, by
examining the types of evidence the Supreme Court has looked to in
34
previous cases involving the Act, and second, by examining the types
35
of evidence Congress cited to when it reauthorized the Act in 2006.
minority persons as election officials throughout the jurisdiction and at all stages of the election
and registration process.” Id. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F).
29. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F.Supp.2d 424, 442 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2013) (No. 12–96) (citing
Determination of the Attorney Gen. Pursuant to Voting Rights Act of 1965, 30 Fed. Reg. 9897
(Aug. 7, 1965)).
30. Determination of the Attorney Gen. Pursuant to Voting Rights Act of 1965, 30 Fed.
Reg. 9897 (Aug. 7, 1965).
31. Shelby Cnty., 822 F.Supp.2d at 442.
32. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. Shelby Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2d at 427.
34. Id. at 465 (assessing “evidence of (1) racial disparities in voter registration (and
turnout); (2) the number of minority elected officials; and (3) the nature and number of Section
5 objections”). A Section 5 objection refers to the Attorney General or a District Court
rejecting a proposed voting change from a jurisdiction covered by Section 4(b)’s coverage
formula.
35. Id. at 465–66 (examining “evidence of [(1)] more information requests; [(2)] Section
5 preclearance suits; [(3)] Section 5 enforcement actions; [(4)] Section 2 litigation; [(5)] the
dispatch of federal observers; [(6)] racially polarized voting; and [(7)] Section 5's deterrent
effect”).
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Looking to the legislative record, the District Court found that there
was still a significant disparity between white voter registration and
36
minority voter registration, that the “percentage of minority elected
officials . . . lag[ged] behind the minority percentage of the
37
population” in 2006, and that there was still evidence of vote dilution
38
and racially polarized voting. The court found that the existence of
39
Section 5 objections in the legislative record demonstrated the
power of preclearance in deterring jurisdictions from trying to pass
40
discriminatory voter legislation. Further, the prevalence of Section 5
objections suggested that Congress had “good reason to conclude in
2006 that Section 5 was still fulfilling its intended function” of denying
41
the passage of discriminatory voting laws.
The District Court denied the County’s motion for summary
judgment and granted the Attorney General’s motion for summary
42
judgment. Shelby County appealed the grant of summary judgment
43
to the D.C. Circuit Court.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since passing the Voting Rights Act in 1965, Section 5 has been
44
reauthorized four times, most recently in 2006. Numerous challenges
have been made to the reauthorizations and the Act itself, though the
45
Court has consistently held that the Act, as passed, is constitutional.
36. Id. at 468.
37. Id. at 469.
38. Id. at 490. Additionally, the District Court found that “between 1982 and 2003, at least
205 proposed voting changes were withdrawn by covered jurisdictions” after the Attorney
General requested more information on the proposal. Id. at 476. Congress had found that these
withdrawals were a strong indication of efforts to discriminate against voters. Id. at 477.
Furthermore, the court used evidence of the Attorney General sending tens of thousands of
federal observers to covered jurisdictions over the last twenty-five years to ensure fair elections
as an indication of the continued need for federal oversight of local elections. Id. at 485.
39. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West 2013).
40. Shelby Cnty., 811 F.Supp.2d at 492. The District Court highlighted that in lawsuits
brought under Section 2, jurisdictions were still being found to have been intentionally
discriminating against minority voters. Id. at 481.
41. Id. at 476. Furthermore, the legislative record revealed forty-two unsuccessful
declaratory judgment actions where a jurisdiction sought preclearance. Id. at 477.
42. Id. at 508.
43. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 858 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.Ct. 594
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96).
44. Id. at 855. Congress reauthorized the temporary provisions of the Act, including
Section 4(b) and Section 5, in 1970 for five years, in 1975 for seven years, in 1982 for twenty-five
years, and finally in 2006 for another twenty-five years. Id.
45. See Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999) (adjudicating a challenge to the
1982 reauthorization); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (adjudicating a

FORMATTED POST FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S FIGHT TO STAY RATIONAL

6/3/2013 10:10 PM

277

The Court’s holdings have relied on both the need to give judicial
deference to Congress’s legislative decisions and the evidence of voter
discrimination Congress presented prior to each reauthorization vote.
More recently, however, the Court has signaled, in dicta, that it would
defer less and that it may use a higher standard of review to analyze
46
Congress’s decisions in the area of voting discrimination.
A. The Court’s Initial Willingness to Defer to Congress
Within the realm of racial discrimination and voting, the Court has
viewed congressional legislation deferentially. The basis for this
deference is rooted in Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, which
authorizes Congress to pass any “appropriate legislation” to enforce a
47
citizen’s right to vote. After the Act was passed in 1965, its
constitutionality was challenged almost immediately in 1966, in South
48
Carolina v. Katzenbach. There, the Court held the Act’s provisions to
be “valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth
49
Amendment.” Even though the Court claimed that Section 5
50
preclearance was an “uncommon exercise of congressional power,”
the Court found Section 5 to be within Congress’s mandate “to
effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
51
in voting” under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Similarly, the Court approved Section 4(b)’s coverage formula
even though Congress had reverse-engineered the formula—it had
identified specific jurisdictions and then created a formula to capture
52
those areas. The Court openly acknowledged that the formula did
not cover every locality that had voting discrimination, yet it held that
“[l]egislation need not deal with all phases of a problem in the same
way, so long as the distinctions drawn have some basis in practical
challenge to the 1975 reauthorization); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973)
(adjudicating a challenge to the 1970 reauthorization); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 337 (1966) (adjudicating a challenge to the 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act).
46. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAUMDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 203
(2009) (“For example, the racial gap in voter registration and turnout is lower in the States
originally covered by [Section] 5 than it is nationwide.”).
47. U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2.
48. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
49. Id. at 337.
50. See id. at 334 (“[T]he Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justify
legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”).
51. See id. at 326.
52. See id. at 329 (noting that “Congress began work with reliable evidence of actual
voting discrimination” in particular jurisdictions and that the “formula eventually evolved to
describe these areas”).
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53

experience.” Thus, the Court found the reverse-engineered formula
constitutional and within Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment.
In subsequent cases, the Court has exhibited a similar willingness
to defer to Congress’s legislative decisions in this realm. For example,
54
in City of Rome v. United States, the Court held that Congress’s 1975
reauthorization of the Act was constitutional; it rejected a federalism
argument against the Act on the ground that the principles of
federalism “are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the
55
Civil War Amendments by appropriate legislation.” The Court
emphasized that the Civil War Amendments were designed to expand
56
federal power and limit state sovereignty. Moreover, the Court
reiterated that “legislation enacted under authority of [Section] 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld so long as the Court
could find that the enactment is plainly adapted to [the] end of
57
enforcing the Equal Protection Clause.”
B. Applying the Rational Basis Test to Voting Rights Act Legislation
The Court has assessed the constitutionality of legislation passed
by Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment using the rational basis
test. Pursuant to this test, the Court has held that “[a]s against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in
58
voting.” Under the rational basis test, Congress is afforded
considerable deference.
To determine whether Congress’s legislation combating voter
discrimination is rational, the Court has looked to the evidence
collected by Congress during the debates on passing and
reauthorizing the Act. In Katzenbach, the Court relied on the
“voluminous legislative history of the Act contained in the committee
59
hearings and floor debates” to conclude that Congress used
53. Id. at 331.
54. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
55. Id. at 179 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Id. at 179.
57. Id. at 176 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324. See also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177 (“Congress could
rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination
it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.”).
59. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (“We pause here to summarize the majority reports of
the House and Senate Committees, which document in considerable detail the factual basis for
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appropriate means to combat racial discrimination in voting.
Similarly, in City of Rome, the Court held that Congress’s
reauthorization of the Act was rational because Congress had found
that political progress by minorities had thus far been “modest and
61
spotty.” The Court further noted that Congress had given “careful
consideration to the propriety of readopting [Section] 5’s
62
preclearance requirement.”
C. First-Generation Barriers to Voting Versus Second-Generation
Barriers
The Voting Rights Act was created to root out various types of
63
devices and tactics used to deny minorities the right to vote. Some of
the barriers identified by the Court, and reflected in the Act, include
64
poll taxes and literacy tests. These types of barriers are commonly
65
referred to as “first-generation barriers” to voting. Section 4(b)’s
coverage formula was designed to identify jurisdictions that had
implemented “first-generation barriers” to deny access to the voting
66
polls.
Recently, Congress has emphasized eradicating “second67
generation barriers,” such as racially polarized voting and vote
dilution. Vote dilution occurs when a majority group votes as a bloc to
effectively nullify a minority group’s vote. The Court has never held
68
that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution, however it
69
has held that vote dilution can violate the Fourteenth Amendment.

these reactions by Congress.”).
60. Id. at 308 (“Congress explored with great care the problem of racial discrimination in
voting.”).
61. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 181 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Id.
63. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308.
64. Id. at 315–16.
65. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96).
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(b) (West 2013).
67. Racially polarized voting in this context refers to a pattern of voting where voters of
one race support the same candidate while voters of another race all support a different
candidate.
68. Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000).
69. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (“[Multimember legislative
districts] could violate the Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize
or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.”).
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D. Gradual Erosion of the Level of Deference
As Congress shifted its focus from first-generation barriers to
voting to second-generation barriers, the Supreme Court distanced
itself from Katzenbach and City of Rome and became less willing to
defer to Congress’s legislative decisions. When Congress began
addressing second-generation barriers to voting, it interpreted Section
5 very broadly as it related to vote dilution. Section 5 provides that a
voting change can only be precleared if the change “neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
70
vote on account of race or color.” Congress interpreted this to mean
that the Act barred voting changes that were non-retrogressive but
had a discriminatory purpose, as well as voting changes that had
71
discriminatory, retrogressive effects regardless of purpose.
The Court disrupted Congress’s understanding of this provision in
72
Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier II) when it held that
Section 5 “does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan
73
enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose.” Thus,
the Court nullified the part of the Act relating to voting changes that
74
only had a discriminatory purpose. Because the Court has never held
75
that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution, after Bossier
II the most Section 5 could do in vote dilution cases was ensure that
76
no backsliding occurred with new redistricting plans. In response to
this decision, with the 2006 reauthorization of the Act, Congress
77
imposed a “purpose” standard in Section 5 and included a provision
78
that defined “purpose” to mean “any discriminatory purpose.”

70. 42 U.S.C.A § 1973c(a).
71. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F.Supp.2d 424, 436 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12–96).
72. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
73. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 341.
74. See Voting Rights Act: Section 5-Preclearance Standards, Hearing before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 12 (2005) (prepared
statement of Mark A. Posner, Adjunct Professor, American University, Washington College of
Law) (“Section 5 ‘purpose’ now has been given a highly specialized and esoteric meaning, the
intent to cause retrogression. As a result, . . . the purpose standard now can almost never make a
difference in whether or not a change is precleared.”).
75. Bossier II, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3.
76. Id. at 335.
77. By imposing a purpose standard, Congress effectively reversed the Court’s holding in
Bossier II.
78. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(c) (West 2013).
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In addition, Congress used the 2006 reauthorization to bypass the
Court’s holding regarding a different aspect of Section 5. When
Congress extended the Voting Rights Act in 1975, it specified that a
voting change could not satisfy preclearance if the change augmented
or diminished the ability of minority groups to elect candidates of
79
their choice. The Supreme Court altered this interpretation in
80
Georgia v. Ashcroft by holding that “the comparative ability of a
minority group to elect a candidate of its choice . . . cannot be
81
dispositive or exclusive” in a Section 5 retrogression inquiry.
Following this decision, Congress amended Section 5 of the Act to
include a new provision stating that any voting change that has the
purpose or effect of diminishing the ability of minority citizens to
elect their preferred candidates is a change that denies minority
82
citizens the right to vote.
E. The Court Indicates a Potential Change in Course
When Congress reauthorized the Act in 2006, it maintained the
long-standing purpose of the Act by not altering the coverage formula
or the preclearance requirements. By 2006, the coverage formula was
using data that was nearly forty years old and was still identifying
jurisdictions that had used first-generation barriers to voting. Yet in
2009, the Court gave its strongest indication that the deference
Congress had enjoyed in earlier Voting Rights Act cases may no
83
longer be appropriate.
Other than Shelby County, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
84
District No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO) is the only case the Court
has heard on the constitutionality of the 2006 reauthorization of the
Act. The petitioner in NAMUDNO was a utility district created in
85
1987 to deliver city services to Travis County, Texas. A board of five

79. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
80. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
81. Id. at 480. Thus, under the Court’s holding in Ashcroft, a State could redraw district
lines so that minorities were likely able to elect candidates of their choice even if that
probability was reduced as compared to the previous districting plan. Id. This would only be
permissible if the State created more districts in this manner than the existing number of “safe”
districts where it was “highly likely that minority voters w[ould] be able to elect the candidate of
their choice.” Id.
82. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b), (d).
83. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (noting that the Voting Rights Act may not
account for “current political conditions”).
84. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
85. Id. at 200.
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members governed the district; Travis County oversaw elections for
86
the board and the registration of voters for the board. Because the
87
district was a political subdivision of Texas, and Texas became a
88
covered state in 1975, the district’s election standards were subject to
89
the preclearance requirements of Section 5. The district filed suit
seeking to be bailed out of the obligations of Section 5, and in the
90
alternative, claiming that Section 5 was unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court only decided the first issue and held that all political
subdivisions can file for bailout, even if they do not fall under the
91
narrower definition of political subdivision in Section 14(c)(2) of the
92
Voting Rights Act.
In addition to expanding the spectrum of jurisdictions that may be
eligible for bailout in the future, the Court may have also offered a
glimpse into its current stance on the Voting Rights Act. With regard
to the appropriate standard of review, the district argued for a
93
“congruence and proportionality” standard, and the government
94
argued for a rational basis standard. Although the Court did not
decide the appropriate standard of review, it did state that the Act
95
“imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.”
Moreover, the Court noted that past success in eliminating many
“first-generation” barriers alone was insufficient to justify retaining
96
the requirements of Section 5. Next, the Court suggested that the
issues Section 5 was created to address may no longer be unique to

86. Id.
87. Id. at 206.
88. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975–Partial List of Determinations, 40 Fed. Reg.
43746 (Sept. 23, 1975).
89. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 206.
90. Id. at 200–01.
91. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (abridged 9th ed. 2010) (defining “political
subdivision” as “[a] division of a state that exists primarily to discharge some function of local
government”), with 42 U.S.C.A. 1973l(c)(2) (West 2013) (“The term ‘political subdivision’ shall
mean any county or parish, except that where registration for voting is not conducted under the
supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any other subdivision of a State which
conducts registration for voting.”).
92. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 211.
93. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end.”). It should be noted that City of Boerne was a Fourteenth Amendment case regarding
the extent of Congress’s ability to use its Section 5 enforcement power.
94. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204.
95. Id. at 203.
96. See id. at 202 (“Past success alone, however, is not adequate justification to retain the
preclearance requirements.”).
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the jurisdictions singled out by Section 4(b)’s coverage formula.
Finally, the Court acknowledged that there was “considerable
evidence that [the coverage formula] fails to account for current
98
political conditions.”
IV. D.C. CIRCUIT COURT’S HOLDING

With NAMUDNO in its periphery, the D.C. Circuit Court
analyzed whether Section 5’s burdens on state sovereignty were
justified by “current needs,” and whether Section 4(b)’s “disparate
geographic coverage [was] sufficiently related to the problem that it
99
target[ed].” The court found that Congress “drew reasonable
conclusions from the extensive evidence it gathered and acted
pursuant to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” to
100
reauthorize Sections 5 and 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act in 2006.
101
The Circuit Court thus affirmed the District Court’s decision.
A. Section 5 Preclearance
The D.C. Circuit Court acknowledged that the standard of review
for legislation enacted by Congress under Section 2 of the Fifteen
102
Amendment is an unresolved issue. Yet, relying on dicta in
NAMUDNO, the circuit court applied the congruent and
proportional test to determine the constitutionality of the
103
reauthorization of Section 5.
The court noted that for the
reauthorization to be congruent and proportional, Congress must
have “documented sufficiently widespread and persistent racial
discrimination in voting in covered jurisdictions” such that case-bycase litigation under Section 2 of the Act, by itself, would prove
104
inadequate.

97. Id. at 203.
98. Id.
99. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
100. Id. at 884.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 859.
103. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
104. Id. at 864.
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Over Shelby County’s objection, the court took into account
evidence of vote dilution that Congress itself had considered when
105
reauthorizing the statute. The court noted that though the Supreme
Court has never held that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits
106
intentional vote dilution, the Court has held that invidious vote
107
dilution violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the circuit court
believed it was entitled to consider “numerous examples of modern
108
instances of racial discrimination in voting” —second generation
barriers.
Similar to the District Court, the D.C. Circuit reviewed the
legislative record and found several categories of evidence that
109
supported reauthorizing Section 5 for another twenty-five years. The
court found the Attorney General’s claim “that the existence of
Section 5 deterred covered jurisdictions from even attempting to
110
enact discriminatory voting changes” to be very persuasive. The
legislative record of the reauthorization demonstrated that, in
comparison to Section 5’s straightforward preclearance power,
Section 2 claims often involved costly and time-consuming litigation,
111
which dissuaded potential litigants from pursuing valid claims. The
court emphasized that while a Section 2 action was pending, a
proponent of the challenged law could win election and enjoy the
112
advantage of incumbency before the law was overturned. Further, a
plaintiff with few resources could not easily seek a preliminary
injunction in such an instance because of the heavy burden of proof
113
required for preliminary injunctive relief.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980)). City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at
66 (“We have recognized, however, that [multimember legislative districts] could violate the
Fourteenth Amendment if their purpose were invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting
potential of racial or ethnic minorities.”).
108. Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 865.
109. Id. at 864–66.
110. Id. at 871 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 24 (2006)). Additionally, the legislative
record revealed that minorities had obtained over 650 favorable outcomes in Section 2 lawsuits
within covered jurisdictions from 1982 to 2005. Id. at 868. Furthermore, the Attorney General,
pursuant to Section 5 preclearance rules, had objected to hundreds of proposed voting changes
by covered jurisdictions based on the determination that the voting changes “would have a
discriminatory purpose or effect.” Id. at 866.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 873.
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Thus, the D.C. Circuit agreed with Congress’s assessment that
“case-by-case enforcement” of voting rights, by itself, would
inadequately protect minority citizens from the constitutional
114
violations documented in the legislative record.
After
acknowledging that Congress is given deference when making
115
legislative judgments, the D.C. Circuit ruled that Congress had
reasonably concluded that Section 5 remained a critical component of
116
the Voting Rights Act.
B. Section 4(b)’s Coverage Formula
Next, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the statute’s geographic
coverage was sufficiently related to the targeted problem. The D.C.
117
Circuit used a study by Ellen Katz from the legislative record to
compare the occurrence of discriminatory voting laws in covered and
118
non-covered jurisdictions. By adjusting the data in the Katz study to
account for population differences between states, the court found
that the rate of successful Section 2 cases in covered jurisdictions was
119
nearly four times higher than in non-covered jurisdictions. The D.C.
Circuit also looked at unpublished Section 2 cases, which were
primarily court-approved settlements, in both covered and non120
covered jurisdictions over the objections of Shelby County. The
court found that eleven of the top fourteen states with the highest
combined number of successful Section 2 cases from 1982 to 2004
121
were covered states. The court concluded that “if discrimination
were evenly distributed throughout the nation, [there would be] fewer
successful [S]ection 2 cases in covered jurisdictions than in non114. See id. at 872 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 57 (2006)) (emphasizing that the
County has “offered no basis” for the court to call into question Congress’s judgment based on
its supporting evidence).
115. See id. at 861 (“Congress ‘is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and
evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.’” (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997))).
116. Id. at 873 (“[W]e, like the district court, are satisfied that Congress’s judgment
[regarding Section 5] deserves judicial deference.”).
117. Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643 (2006) [hereinafter
Katz Study].
118. Shelby Cnty., 679 F.3d at 874 (referring to the Katz study as the “Impact and
Effectiveness” study.).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 875–77.
121. Id. at 876. These eleven states included the seven states that were originally covered by
the Act in 1965: Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Virginia. Id.
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122

covered jurisdictions,” yet there were “substantially more.”
In determining the constitutionality of Section 4(b), the D.C.
123
Circuit also considered the statute’s bailout and bail-in features. The
court noted that the bailout mechanism “‘reduce[d] the possibility of
overbreadth,’” which “‘ensure[d] Congress’[s] means [were]
124
proportionate to [its] ends.’” Although Section 4(b)’s coverage
formula uses old voting data, when supplemented with the legislative
record and the bail-in and bailout provisions of the statute, the court
concluded that the statute’s geographic coverage area sufficiently
125
related to the problem of voter discrimination.
Shelby County appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the
126
Supreme Court under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether Congress exceeded “its
authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments” by
reauthorizing Section 5 of the Act under the “pre-existing coverage
127
formula of Section 4(b).”
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioner’s Argument
Shelby County’s main contention is that Congress’s 2006
reauthorization of Section 5’s preclearance requirement and Section
4(b)’s coverage formula was unconstitutional given present voting
128
conditions in the United States. First, Shelby County alleges that
Section 5 “imposes current burdens” that are not “justified by current
129
needs.” Second, Shelby County claims that even if Section 5 is
130
131
constitutional, Section 4(b)’s “disparate geographic coverage”
does not adequately relate to the problem the Voting Rights Act is
132
trying to fix.

122. Id. at 878 (emphasis in original).
123. Id. at 881.
124. Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533, (1997)).
125. Id. at 883.
126. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 2012 WL 3017723 (U.S.
Jul. 20, 2012) (No. 12-96).
127. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. argued Feb. 23, 2013).
128. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 13, at 18–23.
129. Id. at 23 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
130. Id. at 40.
131. Id. (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203).
132. Id. at 21.
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1. Shelby County’s Section 5 Argument
Shelby County alleges that the type of voting discrimination that
once made Section 5 preclearance appropriate legislation no longer
exists today. Shelby County references a political climate in 1965 in
which there was an “invidious practice of subtly and continuously
altering discriminatory voting laws to circumvent” any gains
133
minorities won through litigation.
Today, preclearance is
unnecessary; between 1982 and 2004 only about 0.74% of all
preclearance submissions were objected to by the federal
134
government. Congress itself said that “significant progress has been
made in eliminating first[-]generation barriers . . . including increased
numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and
135
minority representation” in political offices.
Shelby County notes that the focus now is on second-generation
136
barriers to voting, such as racially polarized voting and vote
137
dilution. However, the County does not consider polarized voting to
be “governmental discrimination,” which it contends is the “only type
138
of conduct Congress may remedy.” Moreover, Section 5 was passed
in 1965 to combat “vote-denial schemes interfering with ballot
139
access,” not claims of the diminishing “effect of ballots once cast.”
These claims of vote dilution should be handled through Section 2
140
litigation and therefore “cannot justify preclearance.”
Furthermore, Shelby County argues Section 5 preclearance is
141
unduly burdensome for covered jurisdictions. Preclearance greatly
supersedes a State’s sovereign authority because a covered state is
unable to create its own voting laws without first getting approval
142
from the federal government. Additionally, the County proffers that
“preclearance compliance has over the past decade required the
commitment of state and local resources easily valued at over a

133. Id. at 27–28.
134. Id. at 29.
135. Id. (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights
Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(1), 120 Stat. 577
(2006)).
136. Id. at 31.
137. Id. at 19–20.
138. Id. at 31.
139. Id. at 32.
140. Id. at 32–33.
141. Id. at 24.
142. Id.
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143

billion dollars.”
Shelby County contends that the 2006 reauthorization of Section 5
made it even more difficult to attain preclearance by requiring
covered jurisdictions to prove that their proposed voting changes did
144
not have “any discriminatory purpose.” In addition, Congress has
changed Section 5’s “mission from preventing ‘backsliding’ . . . to
145
ensuring a certain number of minority-preferred elected officials.”
Without evidence that the same type of “racial animus” that existed in
146
1965 still exists today, Section 5 should not have been reauthorized.
2. Shelby County’s Section 4(b) Argument
If Section 5 is found to be constitutional, then Shelby County
contends that Section 4(b)’s coverage formula is unconstitutional. The
formula in Section 4(b) was originally considered reliable because it
was tied to the use of voting tests and devices, as well as low voter
147
registration, which were prevalent in 1965. The formula’s reliance on
data points from 1964, 1968, and 1972 cannot rationally identify the
148
“jurisdictions likely to discriminate between 2007 and 2031.” For
149
this reason alone, the formula should be found unconstitutional. In
addition, Shelby County claims that the formula would not be rational
even if it were updated to use voting data from the 1996, 2000, and
2004 presidential elections—relying on those data points, Hawaii
would be the only state identified as having current first-generation
barriers to voting, which demonstrates that the triggers the formula
150
uses are no longer relevant today.

143. Id. at 25 (quoting Modern Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, Hearing before the
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 109th Cong. 110 (2006) (statement of Gregory S. Coleman, Weil
Gotshall and Manges)).
144. Id. at 26 (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577
(2006)).
145. Id. (quoting Bossier II, 528 U.S. 320, 335 (2000)).
146. Id. at 39.
147. See id, at 40 (“In Katzenbach, the Court found Section 4(b)’s formula sound in theory
because its inputs . . . reliably indicated a ‘widespread and persistent’ use of intentionally
discriminatory tactics to keep minorities from voting.” (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966))).
148. Id. at 41.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 43–44.
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Moreover, if the coverage formula is being used to target second151
generation barriers then it is under inclusive. The Katz Study
highlights that the highest number of Section 2 lawsuits filed since
152
1982 are found in both covered and non-covered jurisdictions. The
County alleges that the bailout provision in the Act cannot save the
153
coverage formula from its disparate coverage and that the bail-in
154
provision “further undermines the formula’s constitutionality.”
Therefore, Section 4(b)’s coverage formula should be considered
155
unconstitutional as it is no longer rational.
B. Respondent’s Argument
The United States Attorney General argues that while progress
has been made since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, voting
156
discrimination is still a serious problem in covered jurisdictions.
Consequently, the work of Section 5 is not complete and it should not
157
be deemed unconstitutional.
1. The Government’s Section 5 Argument
The Attorney General argues that Congress demonstrated the
efficacy of and continued need for Section 5’s preclearance
requirement. The legislative record shows that Section 5, which allows
States to work with the Attorney General to create permissible laws,
deters States from attempting to pass new discriminatory voting
158
Furthermore, the Attorney General contends that
laws.
159
preclearance has helped to increase black voter registration. This
success suggests Section 5 will help remedy the disparities between
151. See id. at 46 (“A state-by-state comparison of Section 2 litigation data and racially
polarized voting statistics confirms the irrationality of using Section 4(b)'s formula to address
‘second generation’ barriers.”).
152. See id. at 47 (“[N]on-covered Illinois had more Section 2 lawsuits filed since 1982 than
all but three fully-covered States. The same is true of New York, and Florida, even disregarding
the suits filed against their scattered covered jurisdictions.” (citation omitted)).
153. Id. at 54.
154. Id. at 57.
155. See id at 40 (“An appropriate coverage formula must be ‘rational in both practice and
theory.’ . . . [T]he archaic coverage formula reauthorized in 2006 is neither.” (quoting South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966))).
156. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 25, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Jan.
25, 2013) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
157. Id. at 12.
158. See id. at 29 (noting that in 2012 the Attorney General worked with South Carolina to
create a new photo-identification law that a court could preclear even though the Attorney
General had objected to the initial law presented by South Carolina).
159. Id. at 32–33.
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160

Hispanic and non-Hispanic voter registration.
The Attorney General also argues that preclearance is still
necessary to combat new and existing types of voting discrimination.
First, the Attorney General continues to send federal observers to
covered jurisdictions to monitor polling sites because minority voters
161
recently faced voting discrimination in these areas. Second, the
legislative record identified “ongoing problems of vote suppression,
162
voter intimidation, and vote dilution.” Although the Court has not
decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution,
Congress has “unquestioned authority” to bar intentional vote
163
dilution under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress has
repeatedly reauthorized Section 5 to prevent covered jurisdictions
from attempting to minimize the effectiveness of votes cast by
164
minority citizens, including by vote dilution.
Finally, the Attorney General rejects the County’s argument that
voter discrimination can be effectively combated by Section 2
165
lawsuits. First, in order to gather sufficient evidence to prove the
discriminatory effect of an illegal voting practice, the voting law must
166
remain in effect for several voting cycles. Thus, covered jurisdictions
are able to enjoy the benefits of the discriminatory voting scheme
167
until sufficient evidence has been accumulated. Second, Section 2
lawsuits place the burden on minority plaintiffs to prove the
discriminatory aspects of a voting law, whereas Section 5 preclearance
168
places the burden on covered jurisdictions. Covered jurisdictions are
much better equipped to gather information about possible voter
169
discrimination. Third, the Attorney General argues that “Section 2

160. Id. at 33.
161. Id. at 31. The Act also allows the Attorney General to send federal observers to
polling sites in jurisdictions covered by Section 4(b) when necessary to protect the voting rights
of citizens under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973f (West 2013).
Unlike the Attorney General, courts can send federal observers to any jurisdiction that has a
Section 2 lawsuit pending even if the jurisdiction is not covered by Section 4(b)’s coverage
formula. Id. § 1973a(a).
162. Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 33.
163. Id. at 36.
164. Id. at 37.
165. See id. at 39–40 (“Petitioner asserts that Section 2 affords a sufficient remedy. But that
is a judgment for Congress to make, and after months of hearings, Congress concluded
otherwise.” (citation omitted)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 40.
169. Id.
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places a heavy financial burden on minority voters who challenge
illegal election practices” compared to the modest financial burden
170
placed on the covered jurisdictions seeking preclearance.
2. The Government’s Section 4(b) Argument
The Attorney General argues that Section 4(b)’s coverage formula
continues to target the jurisdictions with the most frequent instances
171
of voting discrimination. The Government dismisses the importance
of the data used in the formula because Congress “‘reverseengineer[ed]’ the coverage criteria in Section 4(b) to describe in
objective terms those jurisdictions Congress already knew it wanted
172
to cover.” The important question in 2006 was not about the need to
update the coverage criteria, but whether Section 5 was still needed in
the covered jurisdictions, which Congress answered in the
173
affirmative.
The Attorney General notes that if Section 5
preclearance was unnecessary then covered jurisdictions should have
fewer successful Section 2 lawsuits than non-covered jurisdictions, yet
174
this is not what Congress found.
Finally the Attorney General argues that the geographic coverage
area of Section 5 is not solely reflected in Section 4(b)’s coverage
175
formula. The bailout and bail-in provisions of the Voting Rights Act
ensure that the coverage area is neither over-inclusive nor under176
inclusive. The Attorney General contends that it is “neither unduly
difficult nor expensive for eligible jurisdictions to bail out of Section 5
177
The Voting Rights Act properly identifies the
coverage.”
jurisdictions with the most concentrated racial discrimination in
voting, which allows Section 5 to “‘sufficiently relate[] to the problem
178
that it targets.’”

170. Id. at 40–41.
171. Id. at 49–50.
172. Id. at 49.
173. Id. at 49–50.
174. Id. at 53.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 53–54 (“[T]he geographic scope of Section 5 is not reflected in the coverage
criteria in Section 4(b) alone.”).
177. Id. at 54.
178. Id. at 57 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
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VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Supreme Court will have to determine whether the Voting
Rights Act is constitutional given the political conditions of 2013, and
it should do so under the rational basis test. The Court may avoid
addressing the constitutionality of Section 5 by first determining that
179
Section 4(b) is unconstitutional, but this is inadvisable. Instead, the
Court should first determine that Section 5 is constitutional because
voting discrimination is still prevalent in the United States. The Court
should hold that Section 4(b), however, is unconstitutional because
the coverage formula’s criteria and focus is outdated.
A. The Court Should Continue to Use the Rational Basis Test
Since Katzenbach, the Supreme Court has repeatedly used the
180
rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of the Act. The
rational basis test is an appropriate standard of review because
Congress has authority under the Fifteenth Amendment to pass
181
“appropriate legislation” to combat voter discrimination. Although
Shelby County argues for using the “congruence and proportionality”
182
standard, this standard is inappropriate here because it has only
been used in cases involving Congress’s Section 5 power under the
183
Fourteenth Amendment.
179. Another avenue the Court can take to decide Shelby County is through the Elections
Clause, found in Article I of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The clause permits
“Congress to make or alter those districts [for federal elections] if it wished.” Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court can
avoid deciding the case on Fourteenth Amendment and Fifteenth Amendment grounds if it
decides that the Elections Clause grants “clear authority for Congress to enact Section 5
[pre]clearance procedures for state laws concerning federal elections.” Brief of Gabriel Chin et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S.
Feb. 1, 2013). However, given the reservations expressed by the Court during oral arguments for
NAMUDNO, it is unlikely the Court will approve of a legal argument that could potentially
allow preclearance to continue in perpetuity. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32,
NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (U.S. Apr. 29, 2009) (“[A]t some point it begins to look like
the idea is that [the Act] is going to go on forever.”).
180. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (“Congress may use any
rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”);
Brief for Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 7, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[I]n evaluating prior extensions of
Section 5 . . . this Court has applied rational basis review.”).
181. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (“Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.”).
182. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (“There must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end.”).
183. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218 (2003) (“[P]etitioners ask us to apply the
‘congruence and proportionality’ standard described in cases evaluating exercises of
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Admittedly, in NAMUDNO, some of the language used in dicta
suggests the Court might adopt a more demanding standard of
184
review. Nonetheless, the Court has consistently held that Congress
should be given deference when it legislates under the Fifteenth
185
Amendment.
Moreover, Congress has presented considerable
evidence identifying continued voter discrimination each time the Act
has been up for reauthorization. Thus, there is nothing that justifies a
departure from applying the rational basis standard to reviewing
legislation Congress passed to combat voter discrimination.
B. Section 4(b)’s Coverage Formula Most Likely Will Not Survive
The most difficult decision before the Supreme Court is how
much weight to give precedent. After Katzenbach held that Section
4(b)’s reverse-engineered formula was constitutional—more than fifty
186
years ago —the Court has not reconsidered the constitutionality of
the formula. Moreover, the last time the coverage formula was
substantially amended was in 1975, when Congress added data from
187
the 1972 presidential election to the formula’s calculus. However,
because 2013 does not reflect 1972 and because this is the first solely
188
facial challenge to the 2006 reauthorization of the Act, it is
questionable how much value the Court will give this underlying
precedent.

Congress'[s] power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But we have never applied that
standard outside the § 5 context.” (citation omitted)).
184. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (“[The Act’s] departure from the fundamental
principle of equal sovereignty requires a showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage
is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.”).
185. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (“[The Civil War]
Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on
state sovereignty.”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (“Congress has full
remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in
voting).
186. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 329 (1966). The original basis for the
reverse-engineered formula was to somehow capture most of the jurisdictions that had a long
history of bypassing federal laws and discriminating against voters. Christopher B. Seaman, An
Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Need for a Revised Bailout System,
30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010).
187. Act to Amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400, 401
(1975).
188. In NAMUDNO the petitioner conditionally challenged the constitutionality of
Sections 4(b) and 5, which allowed the Supreme Court to avoid determining the
constitutionality of the 2006 reauthorization of the Act by Congress. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at
205.

FORMATTED POST FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

294

6/3/2013 10:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 8

With the 2006 reauthorization, Congress had the opportunity to
amend the coverage formula to better represent current political
189
conditions, but it actively chose not to do so. Thus, under the Act as
passed, come 2031, jurisdictions that committed voting violations in
the 1960s and 1970s and that have not achieved bailout will still need
preclearance from the federal government to pass new voting
legislation. Yet, according to Representative Norwood, if the
formula’s underlying data had been changed to only include voter
registration data and turnout rates from the 1996, 2000, and 2004
190
presidential elections, Hawaii would be the only fully covered state.
The covered jurisdictions under the updated data formula are not
191
ones that have had a long history of voter discrimination. During
oral arguments for NAMUDNO, Chief Justice Roberts pointedly
asked if the position of the appellant was that “southerners are more
likely to discriminate than northerners” since the current coverage
formula’s use of data from over forty years ago causes it to
192
disproportionately cover southern jurisdictions. The difference
between the jurisdictions that are identified by the “updated” formula
compared to the current formula is too wide for the Court to
reasonably conclude that the formula reflects current political
conditions.
Furthermore, the criteria used to determine covered and noncovered jurisdictions is outdated. The coverage formula was created at
a time when Congress was trying to fight against first-generation
barriers to voting, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and outward
193
intimidation at voting sites. These barriers are different from the
voter polarization and vote dilution problems that Congress is trying
to combat today. Yet, Congress’s shift in focus has not led it to change
194
the criteria used to identify jurisdictions. The current coverage
189. See Seaman, supra note 186, at 38–39 (2010) (indicating that Representative Charlie
Norwood introduced an amendment that “would ‘update’ the Section 5 coverage formula using
voter registration and turnout rates from a ‘rolling test’ based off of the last three presidential
elections.”(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-554, at 2 (2006))).
190. Id. at 39. This type of an update would also cover 1010 jurisdictions in thirty-nine
states. Id.
191. Id.
192. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (U.S. Apr. 29,
2009).
193. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) (“Congress felt itself
confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of our
country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”).
194. For example, because Congress has been using factors that pertain to first-generation
barriers, the formula does not cover counties in Ohio and Florida, which have some of the most
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formula is unable to identify jurisdictions that are currently covered
for first-generation offenses that have not had second-generation
offenses. Therefore, the coverage formula is unconstitutionally
superseding the sovereignty of States that do not have secondgeneration offenses.
Despite the bailout and bail-in corrective provisions of the Act,
the Court is still unlikely to uphold the current formula. Since 1984,
thirty-eight bailouts have been granted for 196 jurisdictions, with
twenty of those bailouts occurring after the Court’s NAMUDNO
decision expanded the availability of bailout to many more
195
jurisdictions. The NAMUDNO Court seemed less than enthused by
196
Moreover, the
the number of bailouts from 1982 to 2008.
197
requirements to maintain bailout status may still prove too onerous.
Thus, the Court should strike the coverage formula because the data
and criteria used are outdated, and because it is considerably difficult
for a jurisdiction to achieve bailout. This will signal to Congress that a
formula must rationally relate to current conditions to justify its use
for an extended period of time.
C. Section 5 Preclearance is Still Constitutional
If the Court first finds Section 4(b) unconstitutional, then it may
not rule on the constitutionality of Section 5 due to the severability
198
doctrine. The first prong of the severability test requires that the
statute, in this case Section 5, continue to operate fully as law without
199
the invalidated portion of the statute. The second prong requires
courts to leave the remaining parts of the statute intact unless the
legislature would not have enacted these parts independently of the

recent examples of voting rights violations. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the
New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 208 (2007).
195. Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 54.
196. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 37, NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (U.S. Apr.
29, 2009) (having being told that eighteen bailouts had been granted since 1982, Justice Scalia
responded that “[i]t’s obviously quite impracticable . . . for anybody to bail out.”).
197. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b(a)(1)(A)–(F) (West 2013).
198. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3161 (2010) (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute, we try to
limit the solution to the problem,” severing any “problematic portions while leaving the
remainder intact. Because [t]he unconstitutionality of a part of an Act does not necessarily
defeat or affect the validity of its remaining provisions, the normal rule is that partial, rather
than facial, invalidation is the required course.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
199. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Severability Doctrine: How Much of a Statute Should Federal
Courts Invalidate?, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 54 (2011).
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200

invalidated portion of the statute. Here, Section 5 preclearance is
predicated on the existence of some formula identifying the
jurisdictions that will be subject to Section 5’s provisions. Therefore,
without Section 4(b)’s coverage formula, Section 5 cannot work and
cannot pass the first prong of the severability doctrine.
However, given the historical significance of this piece of
legislation, as well as the focus on Section 5 in the certiori order, the
Court may first determine the constitutionality of preclearance before
201
focusing on the coverage formula. To rule on the permissibility of
Section 5, the Court will have to answer three questions: (1) Are the
current burdens imposed by preclearance justified by current needs;
(2) in the absence of preclearance, can Section 2 litigation adequately
handle future problems of racial voter discrimination; and (3) are the
factors needed for preclearance constitutionally permissible.
202
The first question was set up by the NAMUDNO Court.
Congress’s 2006 findings of racial voting discrimination must be
weighed against the substantial federalism costs imposed by
preclearance. In addition to the anecdotes of voter discrimination
collected for the congressional hearings, the results from the Katz
Study offer further evidence of continued voter discrimination.
203
Although there are minor imperfections in the testing methods, the
Katz Study did note a higher number of successful Section 2 lawsuits
204
in covered jurisdictions than in non-covered jurisdictions.
Preclearance ought to act as a deterrent for voter discrimination,
which would suggest that covered jurisdictions should have fewer
205
Section 2 cases than non-covered jurisdictions. The difference
200. Id. at 56.
201. The question presented in the certiorari order was phrased in terms of the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Act, as opposed to Section 4(b). Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133
S. Ct. 594, 594 (2012) (phrasing the question presented as whether the 2006 reauthorization of
Section 5 was constitutional under the preexisting coverage formula of Section 4(b)). It would
be unusual for the Court to avoid deciding the constitutionality of Section 5 a second time,
because it did so only four years ago in NAMUDNO. See, 557 U.S. at 205 (disposing of the case
on other grounds).
202. See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203 (“It may be that these improvements [because of the
Act] are insufficient and that conditions continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But
the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs.” (citations omitted)).
203. The study was only able to identify 331 lawsuits that addressed Section 2 claims since
1982, but believed that this “conservatively suggest[ed] that there ha[d] been more than 1,600
Section 2 filings nationwide.” Katz Study, supra note 117, at 655.
204. See id. at 655–56 (“Of the 123 successful plaintiff outcomes documented, 68 originated
in covered jurisdictions, and 55 elsewhere.”).
205. Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 29; Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 871
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96).

FORMATTED POST FINAL READ VERSION (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT’S FIGHT TO STAY RATIONAL

6/3/2013 10:10 PM

297

between expectation and reality indicates that there is a continued
206
need for preclearance.
Next, the Court will have to determine if Section 2 case-by-case
litigation can adequately replace the protection of preclearance.
Several covered states have noted that “Section 2 litigation is so costly
207
208
and burdensome,”
compared to applying for preclearance.
Furthermore, in Section 2 lawsuits the impetus of bringing forth an
action rests entirely on individual litigants who do not typically have
the resources to shepherd an entire case, whereas in preclearance the
onus is on States who are far better equipped. Individual litigants
must themselves pursue temporary injunctions if they want the
discriminatory voting practice suspended for the duration of the
lawsuits. The difficulty in obtaining temporary injunctions coupled
209
with the incumbency pitfalls of Section 2 litigation demonstrates
that Section 2 lawsuits cannot, on their own, adequately ensure the
rights of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Potential difficulties for upholding preclearance may surface when
the Court tries to answer question three. With the 2006
reauthorization of the Act, Congress included provisions in Section
210
211
5 that overturned the Supreme Court’s holdings in Georgia and
212
Bossier II. If the holdings in these two cases turned on statutory
interpretation then Congress’s redefinition of the statute must be
permissible. However, one of Congress’s 2006 amendments to Section
5 requires the creation of districts where minorities have the ability to
213
elect the candidates of their choice. This seemingly violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it

206. A potential issue that may come up with the first question is whether secondgeneration barriers to voting represent a current need that Section 5 was designed to combat.
The Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality of vote dilution under the Fifteenth
Amendment. However, the Court is unlikely to make a determination in this case because
Shelby County has not raised that issue.
207. Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
9, Shelby Cnty v. Holder, No. 12-96 (U.S. Feb. 1, 2013).
208. Id. at 4.
209. Brief for Respondent, supra note 156, at 39–40.
210. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b)–(d) (West 2013).
211. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003) (“A court must examine whether a
new plan adds or subtracts ‘influence districts’ where minority voters may not be able to elect a
candidate of choice but can play a substantial, if not decisive, role in the electoral process.”).
212. See Bossier II, 528 U.S. 320, 328 (2000) (“[T]he language of § 5 leads to the conclusion
that the ‘purpose’ prong of § 5 covers only retrogressive dilution.”).
213. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c(b).
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requires race to become a predominant factor in redistricting. In
order to preserve Section 5, the Court should simply invalidate the
offensive provision—42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b). Ultimately, Section 5
preclearance should be held rationally permissible given the record of
voter discrimination amassed by Congress, as well as the burdens
created by solely relying on Section 2 lawsuits.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court is likely to find the Voting
Rights Act’s Section 4(b) coverage formula unconstitutional. Given
the magnitude of this ruling, the Court is likely to first find Section 5’s
preclearance requirement to be constitutional, which should allow
Congress to create new criteria that can better identify the
jurisdictions that should currently be under the purview of Section 5.
This will not be a popular decision and it will fly in the face of
substantial precedent. However, the conditions in 1982 that justified
reauthorization of the coverage formula were not the same conditions
in 2006 nor today. Just as barriers to voting have evolved from “firstgeneration” to “second-generation,” so too should Congress’s
legislation to fight these barriers.

214. See Georgia, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy J., concurring) (“Race cannot be the
predominant factor in redistricting . . . . Yet considerations of race that would doom a
redistricting plan under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 2 seem to be what save it under § 5.”).

